Contrary to expectations John Kelly’s (1998; 2005) analysis suggests that the election of a Labour government in 1997 caused trade union membership in Britain to stagnate. Discuss`

In the introduction to his work Kelly argues that “…late twentieth century industrial relations are passing through an historic transition” (Kelly, 1998). An effect of this transition, it would appear, was a dramatic decline in membership and influence, and furthermore, its failure to perform its expected renaissance in the more fertile conditions under a Labour government. This essay seeks firstly to assess the existence and extent of stagnation, and having established it, will attempt to explain it in terms of continuity and change. Continuity in terms of economic restructuring, demographic shifts and political zeitgeist, and change in terms of new challenges presented by Labour’s election since 1997. I would like to then turn to the future of the Trade unions, briefly assessing in turn the argument for optimism and a new approach to studying industrial relations by Kelly, and the more pessimistic assessment of Metcalf and Fernie. This will lead to the conclusion that the Trade union movement’s stagnation since 1997 is indicative of a bleak outlook.
When assessing the existence of stagnation, the only possible answer is a simple and stark confirmation. Between 1997 and 2000 membership remained at 7.8 million, with twenty-six fewer Trade Unions (www.dti.gov.uk). By 2005, this had shrunk to 6.4 million members, a two percent decrease since 2004. This stagnation, moreover, occurred in an era of relatively low unemployment, economic growth and after unprecedented decline in the twenty years which preceded it; there were 5 million fewer members and over 200 fewer Trade unions in 1997 than in 1979 (www.dti.gov.uk). This despite, as Metcalf and Fernie have argued, far more benign conditions than in recent decades.
A primary cause of this stagnation and decline is the long term change in Britain’s economic structure, in which the erosion of its large scale manufacturing base has gone hand in hand with a phenomenal boom in its service economy, particularly in the financial sector. This is a shift from a type of industry which was heavily unionised to those which are not, was augmented by a recession which lead to vast unemployment in industries which had traditionally been the bedrock of union membership. In 1954, there were 700,000 miners, in 1994 there were just 10,000; in 1980 the Transport and General workers union had 2 million members, in 2000 it had 700,000 (Fernie & Metcalf, 2005, 103). The replacement of heavily unionised steel, dock work, printing and car manufacture by private sector services has continued unabated by 1997; financial services now make up one third of British GDP and grew nearly five times faster than the economy as a whole last year (www.dti.gov.uk). By 1992 manufacturing had been reduced to two thirds of its 1979 level; it has shown no sign of recovery under a theoretically more sympathetic Labour government.
The effect of these economic vicissitudes were augmented by similar trends in the world economy, with globalisation only serving to toughen competition for Britain’s ailing manufacturing sector and create new markets for its booming financial services. Holliday was perhaps therefore justified in arguing that “Trade Union power may well have declined in the 1980s under any government” (Holliday 1993 314). However, there can be little doubt that the legislative intention of the Thatcher administration was to weaken and restrict Union power, and that its measures have seen no major reversal since 1997.
The Thatcher government, elected in the wake of the ‘winter of discontent’ on an explicit programme of checking union power, produced a devastating legislative reduction in organised Labour’s influence. The ban on secondary picketing and the closed shop, combined with enforced postal ballots on strikes, were crucial factors in Union’s reduced power, and therefore membership. Their domination of industry, and hold on the British worker, had been broken. This was continued apace by the Major government, and Tony Blair was quick to emphasise there “will be no turning back” to the days before 1979 (Ludlam & Smith, 2001, 113) when in opposition. The unions were “taken aback by the hostility that surfaced after Blair became leader (Ludlam & Smith, 114), and New Labour stuck to their line of ‘fairness not favours’, treating the CBI equally to the TUC. Blair’s decision to block the EU directive on consultation work councils, and give the Bank of England Independence, are further signs he has continued the legislative trend of the Conservative era which did so much to lower union membership.
The Conservative government’s refusal to use macro economic policy instruments, particularly inflation policy, in order to support unionised industries or reduce unemployment also accelerated demographic changes which were eating away at the foundations of the union’s social base. Kelly argues that the last 25 years have seen a shift from “the class conscious collectivism of the industrial manual worker to the self interested individualism of the skilled, mobile and career centred white collar worker” (Kelly, 1998, 1). The economic changes detailed above were reflected socially, as the cultural climate which had bred high union membership was replaced in a rapidly changing world. Reiter went as far as to argue that by the mid 1990s, “…social and political realignment had taken place” (Reiter, 1997).
In just 11 years after 1979, Union membership dropped from a third to a half of the workforce (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992, 4). Old working class communities centered around manufacturing industry fractured as those industries declined, and a more meritocratic and competitive economy created great social mobility. Joining a union, which had been conforming behaviour to one generation, became deviant behaviour to the next. Culturally, union membership was seen as anachronistic – ‘male, stale and pale’. Margaret Thatcher pilloried the unions as symbolic of Britain’s failed post war consensus politics, associated with a declining past not a vibrant future; they “had come to symbolise everything that was wrong with Great Britain” (Thatcher, 1993). The miners’ strike of 1984/85 symbolised the cleavage of the country, and indeed the working class; policeman defending the Thatcher state against miner fighting it was a symbolism of a wider clash between home owner against council tenant, North versus South, Tory versus Labour, union member against non-union member.
The defeat of the miners, and more widely of organised Labour in the 1980s, created a climate in which “being a union member has ceased to be the social norm” (Hyman, 2005). The culture which had led young working class men to go into manufacturing jobs and become union members had been dissipated, with a new working class which as Kelly argued above was far more individualistic and striving in its outlook. Observers noted that it was the left leaning middle classes, not the working classes, who wore badges of solidarity with the miners during their year long dispute. Once again, this cultural climate has shown little sign of abating since 1997, as New Labour has broadly continued the economic and social policies which assisted the changing nature of working class culture and employment. Indeed, the only unionised culture it has encouraged or facilitated has been in the white collar public sector, particularly nursing and teaching.
Despite the importance of these continuities since 1997, we have to recognise both that there have been changes and that these have had an, though unexpected, significant effect on union membership and influence. Much of Blair’s pre and post 1997 hostile rhetoric were in order to reassure middle class voters, and his government has provided a more benign environment for unions (Fernie & Metcalf 2005). There were some hugely symbolic legislative moves, such as the return of union rights to GCHQ, and Trade Union leaders such as Alan Johnson (postal workers) were strongly involved in helping Blair deliver his constitutional reforms of the Labour Party while in opposition. Labour delivered measures like a minimum wage, the extension of rights to part time workers, greater parental leave and signing up to the European social chapter which the unions had wanted. The TUC was certainly confident membership would be boosted by those who joined the working population and/or benefited from these measures.
However, as noted above, membership stagnated then continued to decline. Fernie and Metcalf (2005), among others, have convincingly argued this is because these measures were part of a trend for government, and European legislation, to confer the rights normally provided by unions. If workers could obtain workplace representation and empowerment through the law, why join a union? Moreover, partly as a result of these changes wage mark ups in unionised as against non-unionised industries are now very low or zero, and employment is growing three percent slower in unionised industries. Fernie and Metcalf’s (2005) argument that the ‘hostile face’ of the 1980s has largely evaporated, only throws into sharper relief the failure of union membership to replenish in more benign conditions.
It also asks serious questions about the future of mass union membership. Crucially, the legislative base of this more benign atmosphere has been a focus on individual worker’s rights, not union influence. This might help those at the bottom of the pay scale, but it has not motivated them to join a union. While a third of over 50s are union members, only a quarter of 25-34 year olds are (Ludlam and Smith, 2001, 116). Fernie and Metcalf (2005) argue the unions are held back by their own rigid structures, and threatened by the trend toward firms giving worker representation without allowing unions. Their pessimistic analysis appears to be supported by the failure of young and migrant workers to enthusiastically unionise, despite the fact they have none of the negative associations created by awareness of events in the late 1970s.
It would appear, therefore, that the combination of New Labour’s continuity with long term detrimental factors, and the double edged sword of the benign new climate of greater worker welfare, has left membership to stagnate and the union’s very future to be called into question. Kelly (1998) argues for a more optimistic approach, suggesting the right conditions are apparent for a surge in membership and influence. Moreover, he feels current methods of analysis and structures of assessment “…cedes priority to the employer’s agenda of labour utilization and control” (Kelly, 1998, p131). His optimism and rejection of an (in his eyes) post modern analysis which suggests the decline of organised Labour is not shared by Fernie and Metcalf (2005), who feel the inability of unions to sufficiently modernise, and/or effectively penetrate the private sector firms which increasingly dominate the British economy bode ill for its future. The election of a Labour government in 1997, so long sought after by organised Labour as its moment of resurgence has, through a combination of continuity and change, put a further nail in the coffin of its mass membership and influence.